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Abstract

The diagnostic revolution that culminated in the third edition of the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1980) began with the
publication in 1972 of the Feighner criteria, a set of rules for the identification of 16 disorders.
While Feighner et al. claim that their diagnostic categories rest on solid data, the fact is that
one was soon to be removed by the APA from its classification of mental disorders:
homosexuality. However, the anomaly of an extinct category in a list of supposedly validated
diagnostic criteria never became a point of discussion, quite as if the topic were
unmentionable. It was in fact even more of an embarrassment than either side in the
homosexuality debate seems to have realized at the time. Upon examination, the evidence
offered by Feighner et al. in support of the diagnosis of homosexuality proves to be nil. Had
there not been an informal embargo on discussion of the status of homosexuality in the
Feighner document, the makers of DSM-III might have recognized that the diagnosis fails all
Feighner tests of validity. Had they attached greater importance to these tests, the concept of
a disorder that was built into DSM-III might have taken a different shape.
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University of Montana
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Buried in Silence: Homosexuality and the Feighner Criteria

Confusion and Order

The publication in January 1972 of what came to be known as the Feighner criteria
(Feighner, Robins, Guze, Woodruff, Winokur & Munoz, 1972) marked an epoch in the history of
American psychiatry. At a time when many psychiatrists were indifferent or even hostile to the
niceties of diagnosis, and when conflicting interpretations of similar cases threatened the
reputation of the profession itself, the Feighner criteria laid out specific rules for the diagnosis
of 16 disorders, from depression to hysteria, from alcoholism to anorexia. Never before had
the identifiers of such an array of conditions been codified so precisely. At once detailed and
pragmatic, the Feighner specifications furnished a model and precedent for the Research
Diagnostic Criteria (1978), which in turn served as the immediate precursor of the diagnostic
criteria of the revolutionary third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, issued in 1980. The architect of DSM-III and first author of the RDC,
Robert Spitzer, once claimed that before the new manual replaced impressionistic descriptions
of mental disorders with specific criteria, the RDC tested and vindicated the possibility of doing
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so (Spitzer, 1989). However, it was Feighner et al. who got the process started. If DSM-III put
an end to “the disarray that has characterized psychiatric diagnosis” (Bayer & Spitzer, 1985),
thus enabling the APA to emerge strong from a decade in which its unity and credibility were
sorely tested, the Feighner criteria and their authors deserve a share of the credit.
Though readers in 1972 could not know that the Feighner document would contribute
to the making of DSM-III (which was not yet under construction) and could not foresee the
authority of a manual whose existence was not assured until the moment its text was ratified
by the APA, the Feighner criteria’s imprint on the literature was immediate. When DSM-III
finally appeared in 1980 they had already been cited hundreds of times; still more significantly,
according to one present at their creation, within two years of their publication “the impact on
the quality of research papers published in the U.S. was evident. We were now all speaking the
same language!” (Kendler, Muñoz & Murphy, 2010). With investigators using the same
diagnostic criteria, their findings could be expected to agree more often, thereby relieving
psychiatry’s painful “reliability” problem. While reliability is a technical term referring in this
context to concurrence of diagnostic judgments, the word also has lay connotations, and a
profession whose research suffers from unreliability begins to seem to the public unreliable in
its own right, that is, unworthy of trust. No wonder the Feighner criteria were greeted with
enthusiasm. As of this moment, they have garnered some 6700 citations, a remarkable figure.
However, an asterisk should be attached to this tale of the Feighner criteria delivering
psychiatry from its troubles and taming the chaos of conflicting diagnoses. If their wholesome
influence took effect in less than two years, it was also less than two years after publication
that one of the Feighner diagnoses—homosexuality—was removed from the list of mental
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disorders by the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association, a decision affirmed
by the APA membership. Historically speaking, then, no sooner was the ink dry on a document
that appeared to set psychiatric diagnosis on a sound foundation than one of its categories
officially ceased to exist. This is all the more ironic in that homosexuality clearly fails the tests
used by the Feighner authors to certify disorders, most notably clinical profile (that is,
presenting features), outcome studies and family studies, none of which apply to
homosexuality at all. If the authors include homosexuality in the select cluster of disorders that
have been duly validated, it is because, for some reason, they paid no attention to their own
tests in this instance, not because the tests misled them.

Homosexuality

For a diagnosis of homosexuality, A through C are required.

A. This diagnosis is made when there are persistent homosexual experiences beyond age 18
(equivalent to Kinsey rating 3 through 6).

B. Patients who fulfill the criteria for transsexualism are excluded.

C. Patients who perform homosexual activity only when incarcerated for a period of at least
one year without access to members of the opposite sex are excluded.
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[The Homosexuality diagnosis in the Feighner criteria]

An Awkward Topic

The events leading to the excision of homosexuality from DSM-II in 1973 bear a brief
review, in that they help explain how it is that the embarrassment of an extinct category in the
Feighner criteria came to be buried in silence.

Beginning in 1970, gays enraged at the official classification of homosexuality as a
mental disorder staged protests at the annual convention of the group responsible: the APA.
After the disruption of a 1972 meeting attended by Robert Spitzer—who assumed, with most of
his peers, that homosexuality was an illness, and had strong ties with the diagnostic reformers
of the Feighner group—he arranged for one of the protesters and his allies to address the APA
Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, on which he served. With the issue still alive,
Spitzer then organized a symposium at the 1973 APA convention on the question of whether
homosexuality was in fact a disorder. By that time, however, he had had a change of heart.

Having asked himself how we can recognize a mental disorder, Spitzer reasoned that it
should cause either distress or impairment, and that because homosexuality does not
necessarily do either, it is not a mental disorder at all. Political instinct told him, however, that
the APA would not de-list homosexuality without putting something in its place. He therefore
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proposed that the Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics expunge homosexuality from
DSM-II and add a new diagnosis of Sexual Orientation Disturbance for “those homosexuals who
are troubled by or dissatisfied with their homosexual feelings or behavior” (Stoller, Marmor,
Bieber, Gold, Socarides, Green & Spitzer, 1973). (More on this point later.) The Task Force and
ultimately the APA Board of Trustees approved both the deletion of homosexuality and the
installation of the new category, changes ratified in due course by the APA membership as a
whole (Bayer, 1981; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005).

What this chronology leaves out is the bitter division of opinion within the APA, akin to a
civil war, on the status of homosexuality. Indeed, it was the defenders of the original
classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder who petitioned the Board of Trustees for
the plebiscite that eventually went against them and removed the condition, from that day
forward, from the APA index of disorders. The APA membership endorsed the action of the
Board by a majority of 58%, a figure that may constitute a landslide in electoral terms but
hardly bespeaks a united profession. If Spitzer parlayed his success in brokering a settlement of
the crisis into a new (and as it turned out, historic) role as the engineer of an innovative
taxonomy of mental disorders, this too implies that his service as a healer of divisions was
greatly valued because the divisions themselves ran so deep.

Related but not identical or reducible to the conflict between those psychiatrists
committed to diagnostic reform and those who played down diagnosis itself both in theory and
practice, these sharp differences of opinion were on display in the 1973 symposium titled
“Should Homosexuality Be in the APA Nomenclature?”—an event attended by almost a
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thousand (Bayer, 1981). Two psychiatrists and one outspoken gay citizen argued for the frank
deletion of the diagnosis, two psychiatrists for its retention, and one turned the tables, asking
whether the APA lexicon should contain references to heterosexuality. Later the same year
their presentations appeared in edited form in the American Journal of Psychiatry,
supplemented by a paper by Spitzer—given in full—that lays out his compromise solution to
the impasse (Stoller, Marmor, Bieber, Gold, Socarides, Green & Spitzer, 1973). Nowhere in this
paper does Spitzer mention the Feighner criteria, even though the topic of debate was the
validity of the homosexuality diagnosis, and the Feighner criteria, which strongly influenced
him, list homosexuality as a validated diagnostic category. Indeed, as these events unfolded
Spitzer worked closely with one of the authors of the Feighner criteria, Eli Robins (Kendler,
Muñoz, & Murphy, 2010).

But why would Spitzer have brought up the Feighner paper? Not only does it offer no
support for his compromise, it includes a diagnosis he had come to consider both unfounded
and unjust. Presenting as they did a model for the reform of psychiatric diagnosis in its
entirety, the Feighner criteria put Spitzer in an uneasy position. Though it was his work as the
framer of the homosexuality compromise that advanced him to the forefront of the APA as it
undertook the reconstruction of its diagnostic system, and though he would model this revision
on the “operational criteria” introduced by the Feighner group, he could not mention the
fourteenth of the Feighner criteria without seeming to suggest that there was a crack in their
foundation. Once the compromise diagnosis of Sexual Orientation Disturbance was in place,
therefore, Spitzer went about building on the Feighner criteria without bringing up the one
diagnosis among them that divided the APA. He observes the same discretionary silence in his
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1973 paper, written at a time when “Sexual Orientation Disturbance” was a proposal, not an
official diagnosis, and when there was nothing to be gained by referring to the Feighner
document in the first place.

After the APA Board of Trustees voted to de-list homosexuality but before the decision
was ratified by the membership, Spitzer joined officers of the APA in defending the Board
against the charge that it had attempted to legislate science. “Quite the contrary,” argued
Spitzer and colleagues. “It has been the unscientific inclusion of homosexuality per se in a list
of mental disorders which has become the main ideological justification for the denial of the
civil rights of [homosexuals]” (Bayer, 1981). By “a list of mental disorders” Spitzer of course
meant DSM-II, not the Feighner criteria, an itemized set of such disorders, every one of which
purported to rest on good evidence. From Spitzer’s point of view, the less said about the weak
point in the Feighner criteria the better. As we know, when he concluded that homosexuality is
not a disorder, he did so not because it meets not a single one of the Feighner tests of validity
but because it doesn’t necessarily cause distress or impairment.
It was the opponents of de-listing—men like Irving Bieber and Charles Socarides, both
convinced that homosexuality represents a profound distortion of normal development, both
speakers at the 1973 symposium—who had something to gain by invoking an influential
document that judged homosexuality a disorder by nominally rigorous standards. Yet they too
kept the Feighner criteria out of the discussion. Citing a set of diagnostic rules even for
rhetorical purposes may have been distasteful to psychoanalysts like Bieber and Socarides.
When DSM-III was under construction, one psychoanalyst derided its diagnostic system as
displaying “a generous measure of linguistic and conceptual sterility. DSM-III gets rid of the
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castles of neurosis and replaces it [sic] with a diagnostic Levittown” (Bayer & Spitzer, 1985).
Unassuming little boxes that resemble one another and cannot serve as monuments to
anything except anonymity, Levittown houses figure a checklist system also consisting of boxes,
a system that succeeds only in imposing standardization on the rich clinical diversity of the
world. (The metaphor also works the other way, however. Castles belong to the age of faith;
and in the eyes of many the dogmatism of psychoanalytic doctrines—the demand that others
take them on faith—made the diagnostic checklists of DSM-III look rational and attractively
modern by comparison.) The Feighner criteria are a checklist in the making, and those who
detested everything such an instrument stood for would probably have balked at the thought
of citing it as an ally in the struggle to preserve the pathological status of homosexuality.
As in a genuine feud, the psychoanalysts’ disdain of their opponents was returned in
kind. In his capacity as chair of the Psychiatry Department at Washington University, Eli Robins,
one of the senior Feighner authors, is said to have installed a picture of Freud in a strategic
position in the men’s room (Decker, 2013). After graduating from Harvard Medical School,
Robins worked under the tutelage of the skeptical Mandel Cohen, co-author of an important
paper cited by Feighner et al. that has this to say about a discourse by Freud on the topic of
melancholy: “Actually statements such as the above quotation have no clear meaning to begin
with, have no basis in fact, and are examples of a type of unscientific thinking from the last
century that is still prevalent in some localities” (Cassidy, Flanagan, Spellman & Cohen, 1957). A
similarly scathing aside appears in a 1951 paper on hysteria (conventionally psychoanalytical
territory) co-authored by Cohen and Robins, and cited by the Feighner group as well (Purtell,
Robins & Cohen, 1951). Running just below the surface of the Feighner criteria, this sort of
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open derision suggests the intensity of the feuding between the empiricists who sought to
reform psychiatric diagnosis on a medical model and the psychoanalysts who rejected
empiricism root and branch. Why would the latter invoke a set of criteria that descend lineally
from documents that jeer at their own school of thought, even if they could score a debating
point by doing so?
Moreover, the most powerful argument the psychoanalysts could make during the
homosexuality debate was too dangerous to use. With the help of the Feighner criteria, they
could have argued that the empiricists who were on the rise in the APA, and who looked to the
Feighner document as their model and standard, recognized full well that homosexuality was
an illness but now took the opposite view in deference to the pressure tactics of gay activists;
their new position reflected not science but expediency, in fact cowardice. What better proof
that these men and women had betrayed their own convictions and principles than the status
of homosexuality as a validated diagnosis in the Feighner criteria they so admired? As it
happens, many members of the APA did regard the deletion of homosexuality from DSM-II as
“a scientifically indefensible response to gay pressure” (Bayer & Spitzer, 1982). And regardless
of the progressive position they were coming to espouse in public, much of the APA rank and
file may well have leaned privately to the view that homosexuality is a pathology. As long as
psychiatry itself leaned toward etiological explanations (that is, the practice of tracing disorders
back to their presumed causes or origins), it was going to remain receptive to the notion that a
condition persistently linked to a theorized wrong turn in early development represents a
serious illness. In 1973, a diagnostic system explicitly “atheoretical with regard to etiology” (as
the Introduction to DSM-III puts it) did not yet exist.
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In any case, opponents of the removal of homosexuality from DSM-II who suddenly
found themselves on the defensive could have gone on the attack, in terms like these:

The diagnosis of Homosexuality in the Feighner criteria, a document the reformers
among us seem to think represents the way of the future, reveals what the members of
this party really think and what they would say if they had the backbone to say it in the
face of bullying and ridicule. Let the activists shout what they want, homosexuality is a
mental disorder, just as the Feighner criteria state, and just as psychiatry recognized
before the Feighner criteria were committed to paper. The reformers’ interest in
manufacturing a special diagnosis for the benefit of homosexuals who are unhappy over
being homosexuals represents an attempt to soothe their conscience over the betrayal
of their beliefs.

Impugning the honor and honesty of those targeted, such a polemic could have made sworn
enemies of “the reformers among us” from that day forward, could have blown up in the hands
of those who fashioned it, or both. In brief, an ad hominem attack on the de-listers—with the
Feighner criteria providing the gunpowder—could tear the institution of psychiatry apart, which
is perhaps why the defenders of a diagnosis of long standing refrained from launching it. This
restraint, combined with Spitzer and his party’s avoidance of an awkward topic, seems to have
put an effective ban on references to the Feighner criteria in the homosexuality debate shortly
after their publication, even as they were beginning to make their mark on psychiatric research.

Once the divisive category was removed from the APA’s diagnostic system it was never
to be reinstated, and so the debate of 1973-74 receded into history, and the annulled Feighner
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diagnosis into ancient history. The anomaly of a soon-to-be revoked diagnosis in a set of
allegedly validated criteria never became a topic of public discussion or comment in the
literature. Anyone who brought up the matter after the official rescission of the homosexuality
diagnosis might well have been accused of reviving a dead issue, beating a dead horse, reopening old wounds, etc. Even Spitzer, who was at the epicenter of the 1973-74 debate and
probably knew the Feighner categories by heart, and Robins, who co-authored them, make no
mention of deletion in describing how the Research Diagnostic Criteria built on Feighner. “In
developing the RDC, many additional diagnoses were included, such as schizo-affective
disorders, and a number of other diagnoses of importance in the differential diagnosis of
affective disorders and schizophrenia. There are 25 major diagnostic categories” (Spitzer,
Endicott & Robins, 1978). A decade later, long after the issue of homosexuality had cooled
down, Spitzer still wrote around any deletions he and the co-authors of the RDC made to the
Feighner criteria. “We changed the criteria for several of the disorders, added categories that
were not included in the original criteria, and showed that the reliability of these new criteria . .
. was considerably better than had been obtained for psychiatric diagnoses in previous studies”
(Spitzer, 1989).

In time this version of events, along with a disregard of the status of homosexuality in
the Feighner criteria, became something of a tradition. An important 2010 paper
commemorating the composition of the Feighner criteria, two of whose authors were “directly
involved with the events described” (Kendler, Muñoz & Murphy, 2010), contains no reference
to homosexuality and no hint that any diagnosis in the forward-looking document was soon to
be relegated to the status of an archaism. Similarly, Hannah Decker’s account of the
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construction of DSM-III treats the crisis of confidence in psychiatry, Spitzer’s rise to prominence
as the framer of the homosexuality compromise, and the emergence of empirical diagnostic
criteria without ever noting that the template for such criteria contains the very diagnosis that
split the APA. The topic simply slips through the net, much as it did at the time. Years after the
fact, David Healy asked Samuel Guze, one of the leaders of the Washington group and a coauthor of the Feighner criteria, “When homosexuality got dropped [from DSM-II], did it give you
the ground to say that if we’ve been so wrong on this, don’t we need to go back and look at the
rest?” Guze didn’t answer, but did concede that “Until that time . . . I don’t think we had even
considered the issue of whether there is a medical model way [sic] of thinking about
homosexuality” (Healy, 2000).

The denial of the trouble spot in the Feighner criteria is perhaps best illustrated by the
claim by Robert Cloninger, a colleague of the authors, that each of the Feighner categories
including homosexuality was “differentiated by explicit criteria that had been validated in
controlled descriptive, follow-up, and family studies” (Cloninger, 1989). In reality, not even
Feighner et al. claim that their diagnoses have been validated by “a complete series of steps”
(Feighner, Robins, Guze, Woodruff, Winokur & Munoz, 1972). In the case of homosexuality,
they achieved not even the first step, the description of characteristic features; and at that,
none of the three small descriptive studies cited in support of the diagnosis assumes, concludes
or suggests that homosexuality is a pathology.

Missing Evidence
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The Feighner criteria are not exempted from scrutiny by their historical importance but,
if anything, call for scrutiny because of their importance. Certainly the document’s menus of
diagnostic particulars (a format that carried through to DSM-III and beyond) invite inspection,
rich as they are with details like numerical and temporal thresholds. For example, in the case of
Antisocial Personality Disorder, the required showing of five symptoms out of a list of nine
allows in principle for a diagnosis without either an arrest record, a poor work record, or a poor
marital history, arguably the disorder’s cardinal manifestations. Precisely because they reflect
the subject’s history, each of these “symptoms” helps establish the course of the disorder in
conformity with the Feighner standards of validation. Poor marital history seems especially
important, in that the antisocial father has much to do with the disorder’s transmission, as
documented by the first of the two sources cited by Feighner et al., Lee Robins’ Deviant
Children Grown Up (Robins, 1966).

Among the 19 diagnostic criteria for sociopathic (later antisocial) personality given by
Lee Robins is homosexuality, classed as a perversion. The appearance of this judgment in a
meticulous follow-up study of cases originating in the 1920’s suggests that even a principled
effort to clear one’s work of loose terms and psychoanalytic influences may not be enough.
And so it is with the Feighner criteria.

If the category of homosexuality in the Feighner criteria posed an embarrassment to
those who wanted both to de-medicalize sexual preference and reform diagnostic criteria on
the Feighner model, the issue should have been still more awkward than it was. The first sign
14

that something is amiss is that unlike every other Feighner diagnosis (one of which, hysteria,
requires at least 20 symptoms), homosexuality has but a single inclusion requirement:
“persistent homosexual experiences beyond age 18.” That someone who has “persistent
homosexual experiences” exhibits homosexuality seems more like a tautology than a diagnosis.
In the case of other disorders, the Feighner criteria offer sets of instructions for investigators
interested in assembling a diagnostically uniform population; in the case of homosexuality, such
investigators would have to rely on patients simply identifying themselves as homosexual, just
as if the Feighner criteria didn’t exist.
Furthermore, and most importantly, homosexuality meets none of the Feighner
standards of validation. It cannot be detected in the laboratory, does not have an outcome
(and thus does not lend itself to outcome studies), does not run in families in the manner of a
disorder with a strong genetic component, and cannot be linked with any particular family
constellation, notwithstanding the ingenuity of psychoanalytic theorists. Indeed, it has no
identifiers other than homosexuality itself, thereby ruling out clinical description, the first of the
Feighner validators and preliminary to all the others. Perhaps because pointing to the literature
seems the only remaining way to ground the diagnosis of homosexuality on something solid,
Feighner et al. do just that. However, the studies they cite as validation of their diagnostic
criteria offer no support for the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder in the first
place.

Sources Cited in Support of the Feighner Diagnosis of Homosexuality

15

1. Kinsey AC, Pomeroy WB, Martin CE: Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia, WB
Saunders Co, 1948.

2. Hemphill RE, Leitch A, Stuart JR: A factual study of male homosexuality. Brit Med J 1:13171323, 1958.

3. Saghir MT, Robins E: Homosexuality: I. Sexual behavior of the female homosexual. Arch Gen
Psychiat 20: 192-201, 1969.

4. Saghir MT, Robins E, Walbran B: Homosexuality: II. Sexual behavior of the male homosexual.
Arch Gen Psychiat 21: 219-229, 1969.

With no specifics, and in one batch, Feighner et al. give four sources as authority for
their homosexuality diagnosis, beginning with Kinsey’s famous Sexual Behavior in the Human
Male. No reason is given for omitting the companion volume on the human female, even
though companion papers on male and female homosexuality are also among the four sources.
And as we look into the four, our perplexity only deepens.

To anyone familiar with the Kinsey report, it can only be astonishing to see it cited as
evidence of the pathological nature of homosexuality. Kinsey emphatically did not judge
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homosexuality a psychiatric disorder; in defiance of one and all who traced it to a flaw or
“arrest” of the normal process of development, he affirmed it as a natural variation of human
sexual response. State he and his co-authors, “In view of the data we now have on the
incidence and frequency of the homosexual, and in particular on its co-existence with the
heterosexual in the lives of a considerable portion of the male population, it is difficult to
maintain the view that psychosexual reactions between individuals of the same sex are rare and
therefore abnormal or unnatural, or that they constitute within themselves evidence of
neuroses or even psychoses” (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948). Of all the sexual practices
Kinsey documented, and of all such practices widely deplored as deviant, the one the closest to
his heart was undoubtedly homosexuality. Unbeknownst to the authors of the Feighner criteria
and the world at large, Kinsey (who died in 1956) was himself a practicing homosexual, as well
as a committed enemy of the moral code that branded homoeroticism as either a sin, a crime,
or a sickness (Jones, 1997). His magnum opus—“the book he hoped would contribute to a
public dialogue that would one day rid the United States of sexual repression, inhibitions, and
prudery” (Jones, 1997)—was to have been a volume on homosexuality he did not live to write.
It was in the spirit of Kinsey that in 1972 (the year of the Feighner criteria) one of his
collaborators, Wardell Pomeroy, joined forces with the Gay Activist Alliance in its assault on
psychiatric authority (Bayer, 1981). One can only imagine what Kinsey, an evangelist for sexual
liberation, a controlling man who detested psychiatrists as officers of social control, would have
thought of an influential psychiatric paper that cited his own work as somehow grounding the
classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder.
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While the Feighner group certainly could have invoked the psychoanalytic literature on
homosexuality as an illness, they did no such thing, presumably because they gave no credence
to psychodynamic theorizing. Their three additional sources, all descriptive, none theoryheavy, offer no more support than Kinsey for listing homosexuality as a mental disorder.
Hemphill et al., the authors of a study of a population of homosexual men in two British
prisons, conclude that their investigation “has demonstrated only minor differences between
homosexuals and normals” (Hemphill, Leitch & Stuart, 1958). How minor differences might
tend to validate the diagnostic category of homosexuality is not at all clear. Still more puzzling
are the two remaining sources given by the Feighner authors: companion studies of female and
male samples by teams headed by Marcel Saghir (Saghir & Robins, 1969; Saghir, Robins &
Walbran, 1969). Both studies expressly disregard the question of whether homosexuality
constitutes a pathology, though the first does suggest, on the basis of its sample, that “a
homosexual woman is able to produce and achieve, despite any psychological and social
handicaps that she might have to cope with,” while the second notes that 84% of the study
population “had not had disability, psychiatric or social, of any significant degree.” The
Feighner group’s citation of the paired studies as validation of the diagnosis at issue is
bewildering not only in that both take an explicitly agnostic position on the pathology question,
but in that both are co-authored by a senior member of the group itself, Eli Robins. Thus,
Robins, wearing a Feighner hat, appeals to a conclusion that Robins in a Saghir hat never
reached.

To compound the confusion, Robins co-authored both the Feighner criteria (which of
course list homosexuality as a disorder), the Research Diagnostic Criteria (which do not), and
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another paper published the same year as the RDC (which does). Though homosexuality does
not support outcome studies because it does not have an outcome, Robins, a pioneer of such
studies (Robins & Guze, 1970), groups homosexuality in the latter paper with a number of
disorders whose chronicity has been established (Robins, 1978). It is as if he now interpreted
homosexuality’s lack of an outcome not as removing it from the category of disorders but as
confirming its identity as an especially intractable one. The classification of homosexuality as a
chronic disorder is hard to reconcile with Robins’ general policy of diagnostic skepticism. “As
Spitzer and [co-author] Endicott substantially expanded the number of disorders in the RDC
[Research Diagnostic Criteria] beyond those considered in the Feighner criteria, Robins kept
asking, in a persistent and skeptical manner, ‘What is the evidence?’ They came to appreciate,
as a result of these interactions, the importance of basing diagnostic criteria, wherever
possible, on data rather than solely on clinical wisdom” (Kendler, Muñoz & Murphy, 2010). The
implication seems to be that the Feighner criteria rest on rock-solid data, and therefore any
increase of diagnostic categories beyond the modest Feighner total had better do so as well.
However, one of the Feighner categories rests on sand, as we discover as soon as we look into
the sources alleged to validate it. The “data” underlying the Feighner diagnosis of
homosexuality would have told a cautionary tale to anyone in the 1970’s concerned with
reforming the criteria of mental disorders, if only he or she were willing to investigate.
However, an informal embargo on discussion of the status of homosexuality in Feighner et al.
served to black out a living example of the potential weakness of even “validated” diagnostic
criteria.
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In the Feighner diagnosis in question, one such weakness is that the four cited sources
differ so markedly that citing them as one lot is like asking parts designed for different engines
to work together. The sample population in Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior of the Human Male ran to
some 5300 subjects, the corresponding populations in the three papers a few dozen each.
Related is the vexed issue of representativeness. While Kinsey’s critics argued that his highly
selected sample did not represent the American population as a whole (and could not possibly
represent anyone who declined to submit to his interview), Kinsey, calling on his experience as
a taxonomist, believed sheer power of numbers could make up for the lack of random
sampling. (Kinsey hoped eventually to collect 100,000 interviews, a figure suggestive of the
extremity of the imperative that drove him.) Hemphill et al. seem to have chosen prisoners as
their sample because “it is among habitual homosexual offenders that the most pronounced
forms of homosexuality are often to be found” (Hemphill, Leitch, & Stuart, 1958); thus, the
features of homosexuality will be exhibited with all possible salience and clarity. According to
the authors, the very “intensity” of homosexuality in this sample lends “all the greater force” to
their finding that the men do not differ significantly from the general population. Perhaps
mindful of the Kinsey controversy, Saghir and Robins for their part candidly admit that they “do
not know how representative this sample [of 57 women] is of the total female homosexual
population” (Saghir & Robins, 1969), a disclaimer reiterated in the companion paper on males.
Neither paper, therefore, can be taken as offering a description of the typical presenting
features of homosexuality, assuming they exist. Similarly, while Kinsey’s sample included
prisoners, and while he seems to have sought out in particular those convicted of sex crimes
(for whom he felt a strong sympathy), the Hemphill et al. study concerns only men imprisoned
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for sex crimes, while the two remaining papers specifically exclude any subject who had been in
state or federal prison. In short, the four sources agree only in not viewing homosexuality as a
pathology. What were Feighner et al. thinking of when they cited this curious assortment as
the evidentiary basis of the diagnosis of a mental disorder?

As if to compound the irony of grounding the classification of homosexuality as a mental
disorder on four inapposite sources—with the most important being the work of a sexual
libertarian—two of the Feighner authors (Woodruff and Guze) proceeded to co-author a
textbook that includes homosexuality as a diagnostic category, while a third (Robins) coauthored a volume that recommends against treating it as a disease.

The Woodruff and Guze textbook of diagnosis defends listing homosexuality on the
grounds that it “leads to psychiatric consultations, meets the criteria for a useful category,
and—as long as this persists—is a subject physicians should know something about” (Woodruff,
Goodwin & Guze, 1974). While a merely useful diagnosis falls short of validity as the authors
well knew, the category remains, hanging in mid-air. The only evidence given that
homosexuality constitutes an illness is that “both homosexual men and women are at relatively
higher [sic] risk for depression, suicide attempts, and alcohol or drug abuse,” all of which might
be explained just as readily by the abhorrence of their condition by the world around them as
by the condition per se. While a Preface states that the authors abstain from speculative
theories of causation (as DSM-III would state as well), they continue to presume that
homosexuality in and of itself causes the distress associated with it. The Preface was written in
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December 1973, the month in which the trustees of the APA erased the homosexuality
diagnosis from DSM-II.

Also in 1973, Saghir and Robins published Male and Female Homosexuality: A
Comprehensive Investigation, which resembles conceptually the 1957 study of manicdepressive disease led by Robins’ mentor Mandel Cohen, except that while the Cohen
population was severely ill, the homosexual sample was not ill at all. Though the introductory
material employs terms like “syndrome,” “etiology,” “treatment,” “natural history,” and
“outcome,” all of which pertain to disorders, the authors explicitly assume that homosexuality
is not a disorder and conclude that “treating homosexuality as a disease and homosexuals as
patients is neither scientifically tenable nor actually feasible and practical.”

What If?

Allowing themselves a bit of counterfactual speculation, the authors of a history of the
Feighner criteria ask, “What would have happened to the course of American psychiatry if they
had never emerged?” When they put this question to Spitzer, he suggested that the campaign
to reform diagnosis would have been less successful and its upshot, DSM-III, quite unlike the
manual we know. “The effect would have been big. Operationalized criteria would probably
have emerged, but it would have been years later and probably in a less systematic form. DSM-
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III would have been delayed and would likely have looked quite different” (Kendler, Muñoz &
Murphy, 2010).

In a similar spirit of the counterfactual we can ask, “After the APA de-listed
homosexuality, what if reformers acknowledged that one of the Feighner categories had been
nullified, and what if inspection of the evidence supporting it revealed that it had really been
invalid all along?” The second of these questions hinges on the distinction between the
reliability and validity of diagnostic criteria, the former referring to their capacity to generate
identical findings, the latter referring to their accuracy or objective warrant. To the
practitioners of psychoanalysis, “reliability” and “validity” were foreign terms; indeed, both
belonged to the effort to introduce the diagnostic practices of a medical discipline into a field
under heavy psychoanalytic influence. However, while the Feighner team may have sought to
dismantle the castles of neurosis, they continued to use the psychoanalytic catch-all in the
name of three disorders: Anxiety Neurosis, Obsessive Compulsive Neurosis, and Phobic
Neurosis, all imported from DSM-II. The persistence in the Feighner paper of the heavy-laden
term “neurosis” (eventually excluded from DSM-III after yet another furor) suggests that the
document is not a clean break with past practice and may not be entirely committed to its own
more rhetorical claims—above all, that its criteria owe nothing to tradition and are wholly
evidence-based, that is, valid.

At the time of the Feighner criteria, the diagnostic term “validity” was in its infancy.
Born of enthusiasm over the possibilities of biological psychiatry, it had been introduced in
1969 by two researchers, Donald Klein (later a member of the DSM-III Task Force) and John

23

Davis, who proposed that certain mental maladies have specific causes, knowledge of which
allows for accurate prognosis and appropriate treatment, as with somatic diseases; diagnosis in
such cases has “explicit validity” (Shorter, 2005). Clearly, the diagnosis of homosexuality does
not meet this ambitious standard, if only because the alleged disorder has no cause (beginning),
course (middle) or proven treatment (end). In the Feighner paper, with its admission that none
of the listed disorders has yet been “fully validated,” the term “validity” has already lost some
of its ebullience. In an interesting comment, the authors note that they have excluded
diagnoses for which “sufficient data for even limited diagnostic validation are not available,” for
example, the still-unestablished diagnosis of Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder. The
paper they cite in this connection uses Washingtonian tests, including clinical profile, course
and outcome, but does not offer its findings as confirming, as yet, the existence of a disease
entity (Small, Small, Alig & Moore, 1970). How the Feighner group came to believe that the
diagnosis of homosexuality survives the same tests is hard to fathom. To be sure, this is not to
suggest that the tests are misconceived; on the contrary, the diagnosis is misconceived, as the
tests themselves show.

In the construction of DSM-III, for its part, it appears that emphasis fell on the reliability
of diagnostic criteria, and with it their potential to put an end to the scandal of inconsistent
diagnoses that threatened the credibility of American psychiatry as a whole. The Feighner
diagnosis of homosexuality brings the distinction between reliability and validity into sharp
relief, in that a patient with “persistent homosexual experiences beyond age 18” obviously
exhibits homosexuality, yet it is not obvious that homosexuality itself qualifies as a mental
disorder. Hence the conflicting positions taken by Feighner authors on the latter issue in books
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published shortly after the Feighner criteria themselves. By claiming that homosexuality serves
as a useful diagnostic category for psychiatry, but not going so far as to claim that the category
is valid, two of these authors appear to acknowledge that a diagnosis can give psychiatry
something to work with despite lacking an evidentiary foundation. It happens that another of
the Feighner authors, Robins, is on record as assessing the accuracy (that is, validity) of the DSM
itself at close to zero (Healy, 2002).

According to Nancy Andreasen, a member of the DSM-III Task Force who had been a
resident under George Winokur, one of the authors of the Feighner criteria (Decker, 2013),
“principles of validity” were “much less emphasized” than reliability while DSM-III was under
construction; that is, the designers were preoccupied with drafting diagnostic criteria clear and
specific enough to bring different observers to the same conclusion (thereby putting an end to
the public spectacle of psychiatrists wrangling over their own ABC’s) (Andreasen, 2007). The
hope was that validating evidence for the various “reliable” diagnostic categories would
accumulate over time. However, as some, including Andreasen, have observed, over the years
the DSM categories tended to harden, as if they had been underwritten by solid evidence all
along. According to Andreasen, the unfortunate and unintended result of the framers’ focus on
reliability, and of the canonization of DSM categories over time, is that the DSM system came to
suffer from a critical lack of validity. “Validity has been sacrificed to achieve reliability. DSM
has given researchers a common nomenclature—but probably the wrong one.” Loss of validity
follows inevitably from the decision by the framers of DSM-III to add no fewer than 241
diagnoses to the 24 of the Research Diagnostic Criteria, which themselves expand on the
Feighner 16. What could have discouraged such taxonomic exuberance more effectively than
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the warning example of a paper that set diagnostic standards but includes an annulled
diagnosis—one whose complete lack of supporting evidence somehow escaped notice in real
time?

Almost simultaneously with Andreasen’s comment on the framers’ over-emphasis on
reliability came Horwitz and Wakefield’s well-founded critique of the DSM diagnosis of
depression. Contending that sadness in response to the adversities of life itself should not be
judged a mental disorder, they too underscore the cost of allowing reliability to overshadow
validity of diagnosis.

As many concerned critics pointed out, just creating a reliable system that has clear
rules that everybody can follow does not ensure even an approximation of validity:
unless the rules are accurate, the reliability might just represent everybody together
getting the same wrong answer! For example, if symptoms of intense sadness are used
to indicate depressive disorder, such symptoms might be identified reliably, but the vast
majority of conditions so recognized might not, in fact, be disorders. (Horwitz &
Wakefield, 2007)

Analogously, if a rule dictates that any adult who has persistent homosexual experiences suffers
from the mental disorder of homosexuality, then a dozen psychiatrists will have no difficulty
arriving at the identical finding that James, a practicing gay male, has this disorder even if it is
not in fact a disorder—as the APA ruled in 1973. If the members of the APA had used the
decision to remove homosexuality from DSM-II as an occasion to reflect on the recent and
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already influential attempt by Feighner et al. to set diagnosis on a secure foundation, they
might have realized then and there how readily validity can be “sacrificed to achieve reliability.”

While the Feighner authors appear to view their criteria as preliminary constructs that
may one day lead to actually valid specifics, they also claim to have tested their validity with
impressive results. The fact is that “most of the key features of the Feighner criteria were not
directly based on systematic empirical study” (Kendler, Muñoz & Murphy, 2010), as two who
witnessed their construction report. To evaluate their validity, therefore, one is obliged to
investigate the literature underlying them, which I have tried to do in the case of the one
unmentionable Feighner category. Notwithstanding the group’s claim that their criteria are
“based on data rather than opinion or tradition” (Feighner, Robins, Guze, Woodruff, Winokur &
Munoz, 1972), it turns out that the Feighner criteria for a diagnosis of homosexuality are based
on nothing at all. Nor is this the only Feighner diagnosis whose textual sources repay
examination.

Anyone who looked into the primary source for the first set of diagnostic criteria drafted
by the Feighner group—those of depression, soon to become the feature diagnosis of the
Research Diagnostic Criteria and later the most common diagnosis by far under the post-1980
DSM system (Horwitz, 2011)—would discover that it does not intend its checklist of symptoms
for diagnostic use. The report of the 1957 study led by the Freud-skeptic mentioned earlier,
Mandel Cohen, concludes, “Manic-depressive disease can be diagnosed by the usual medical
procedure of using history, examination, and laboratory data” (Cassidy, Flanagan, Spellman &
Cohen, 1957)—not by means of a checklist. The checklist in this study was not used
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diagnostically but administered to a group of in-patients who had already been diagnosed—
with no shortcuts or ticked boxes—as suffering from manic depression (Justman, 2018). Much
as gays in the early 1970s made the telling argument that psychiatry could not generalize with
any validity from the small sample of gay patients seen by psychiatrists, the eventual use of
criteria closely modeled on the Feighner list (which was itself closely modeled on the 1957 list)
to screen for depression was open to the objection that the criteria evolved from an instrument
designed for use on profoundly ill patients and are therefore inapplicable to the general
population without loss of validity.
Similarly, whereas homosexuality does not have an outcome or (without doing violence
to language) a clinical course, the symptom-period for depression set by DSM-III at two weeks is
so brief that it can easily catch transient episodes and does not in any case allow clinical course
to manifest itself. In the 1957 study by the Cohen group half the patients had been ill for more
than six months, and a third for more than a year. With no reason given, the Feighner criteria
for depression set the symptom-period at one month. The Research Diagnostic Criteria, with
no reason given, lower the threshold to as little as one week for “probable” and two weeks for
“definite” depression. Placing symptoms in a social vacuum (like one who evaluates a gay
person’s self-conflict in disregard of the loathing of homosexuality in the world at large), the
DSM-III checklist modeled on the RDC is easy to apply and therefore lends itself to reliable or
reproducible diagnosis, even though its two-week threshold, a product of authorial fiat, lacks
validity.
If, as some believe, the same sort of debate that led to the removal of homosexuality
from DSM-II could have broken out about many DSM-III diagnoses if the stakes were high
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enough (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992), then the homosexuality issue potentially resonates
throughout the DSM system. Before or after the de-listing controversy in 1973, anyone who
checked the sources underwriting the diagnosis of homosexuality in the Feighner criteria,
instead of veiling the entire issue in silence, might indeed have been led to rethink the matter
of reliability and validity from the ground up. More generally, discussion of the absence of
evidentiary support for the Feighner diagnosis might well have inspired diagnostic modesty, a
virtue in anyone who sets out to design a taxonomy of the mind’s ills, like DSM-III. What the
three medical studies cited by Feighner et al. as validation of the homosexuality diagnosis
actually suggest is that when psychoanalytic doctrine is set aside, evidence of the pathological
nature of homosexuality seems to go with it. The Robins and Saghir studies in particular, with
their methodological resemblance to work by the anti-Freudian Mandel Cohen, are strikingly
free of both analytic terminology and the preconceived conclusions about homosexuality
packed into it. Unburdened by presumptions of pathology, these studies too serve as
encouragement to humility.
While we can’t be sure that the effect of spotlighting the homosexuality problem in the
Feighner criteria would have been big, it’s just possible that if leaders of the APA like Spitzer
had unearthed and examined the sources offered in support of the Feighner criteria, reliability
and validity would have found a better balance in the diagnostic system they created. If they
had realized that the absence of clinical profile, course and outcome accounts for the absence
of evidence offered by Feighner et al. for the pathological nature of homosexuality, they might
have attached due importance to such validators as they went about constructing a new
classification of mental disorders. For at least one member of the DSM-III Task Force, public
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exposure of the baselessness of one of Feighner diagnoses would have touched a nerve. As a
co-author of the Feighner criteria, Robert Woodruff had a personal stake in their reputation.
Perhaps he would have reacted defensively to free and open discussion of the hollowness of
one of them; perhaps not. In either case, he might well have been led to reconsider his
standards of validity and if so, he was well positioned, as a member of the Task Force’s inner
circle (Decker 109), to shape the evolving text of DSM-III accordingly. In the event, Woodruff
committed suicide while DSM-III was in the draft stage.

The Making of a Disorder

Wrote Christopher Boorse a few years ago, “If, as many people believe, the American
Psychiatric Association normalized homosexuality in 1973 because of a fear of further public
protests, it was the end of psychiatry’s claims to be a science” (Boorse, 2014). Patently
inapplicable to homosexuality, Washingtonian validators like clinical profile, course and
outcome offered the APA an opportunity to normalize homosexuality not only without violating
the canons of science but as part of the effort to make diagnosis more scientific, as Feighner et
al. aspired to do. This opportunity was sadly missed. During and after the declassification
affair, combatants on both sides leveled the accusation that science was being sacrificed to
expediency, and Spitzer later concluded that the controversy came down to a question of
values (Spitzer, 1981). If he himself hadn’t chosen to ignore homosexuality’s zero score on the
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Feighner tests, the APA might have had something other than passion and preference to guide
its action.
Some would argue that all the Feighner criteria can do is delineate one mental disorder
from another—they can’t establish whether a condition amounts to a disorder in the first place.
It was the firm belief of the Feighner group, however, that in the current state of knowledge
investigations like family- and follow-up studies, which underlie their diagnostic criteria (in
part), represent the best way to establish disorder. They envisioned themselves as working to
set psychiatry on an appropriate medical foundation and, more particularly, to codify the
identifiers of specific disorders at a time when diagnostic standards were weak and the
existence of any and all mental disorders was hotly disputed. As shown by their
recommendation of no diagnosis for cases where symptoms are “minimal,” they certainly gave
thought to the line between disorder and non-disorder. If (as they note) diagnosis guides
treatment, it would be a travesty to treat a disorder that is really a non-disorder. Yet the
inclusion of homosexuality in a list of validated disorders is itself a travesty. If the anomaly of
homosexuality in the Feighner document had been discussed at the time, all would have
recognized what was at stake—its very standing as a disorder—and anyone who wanted to
make the case that it is a disorder despite not behaving like one would have borne a heavy
burden of argument.
Even as the influence of the Feighner criteria began to make itself felt, the APA worked
on a definition of mental disorder in an effort to parry the claim that psychiatry was not a
medical discipline at all, merely an institution of social control (Cooper, 2005). Feighner et al.
affirm psychiatry’s medical identity by predicating the classification of a condition as a mental
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disorder on its natural history. In effect, they assume that if a condition behaves like a
disorder—has characteristic presenting features, runs in families, follows a typical course and
lends itself to follow-up studies, like schizophrenia, for example—then in all likelihood it is a
disorder, even in the absence of a known cause. (Conversely, however, if a condition in no way
behaves like a disorder, then in all likelihood it isn’t.) While Spitzer sought out and worked with
the Washington school, the DSM concept of disorder he did much to frame—that of a
syndrome associated with distress or impairment—does not have a Washingtonian cast. How
then did DSM-III defend itself against the charge that psychiatry is simply an enforcer of social
norms? By specifying that a disorder does not simply reflect “a conflict between an individual
and society.” As noted by Wakefield in a thoughtful commentary, the DSM concept of disorder
factors in to this extent the circumstances in which a patient is immersed. It follows that
“labeling people as disordered when their distress is due to an oppressive environment is not
only incorrect but potentially harmful because it suggests that something is wrong with the
person and it directs interventive attention toward the person's internal functioning and away
from the person-environment interaction. For example, a child in an abusive environment, a
homosexual person in a homophobic environment, and a dissident in a politically repressive
environment might experience distress, but it is incorrect and potentially harmful to label such
people as disordered on that basis alone” (Wakefield, 1992). Sometimes, it seems, distress is
too well-founded, too appropriate, to be deemed disordered.

According to Wakefield, while the DSM definition of disorder has its merits, in all it
represents a failed attempt to operationalize the concept of harmful dysfunction—that is, a
damaging malfunction of an internal mechanism. A malfunction implies, in turn, a failure to
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work as nature intends; and it seems to me that we get nowhere by circling back to the old
question of whether or not nature intends human beings to be homosexual. However, the
status of homosexuality isn’t at issue in Wakefield’s paper, in that the DSM-III-R definition
under discussion specifically excludes “deviant behavior, e.g., political, religious, or sexual.”
Still, in another sense homosexuality lies at the heart of the paper, because it was in the
context of the homosexuality controversy that Spitzer first framed the distress and disability
criteria that govern the concept of disorder that is at issue. Recall that Spitzer reasoned that a
disorder must cause distress or disability, and that because homosexuality doesn’t necessarily
do either, it doesn’t constitute a disorder. For one whose orientation does cause distress he
proposed the diagnosis of Sexual Orientation Disturbance, even if the patient happens to be “a
homosexual person in a homophobic environment.” Thus, because many homosexuals are not
distressed, homosexuality is not a disorder, but because many are, they qualify for disorder
anyway. This deft application of the notion of distress solved an acute political crisis, at once
legitimizing the de-listing of homosexuality and keeping it on the books in deference to those
unprepared to say that it wasn’t psychiatry’s concern.

If Spitzer had related the distress of Sexual Orientation Disturbance to the possibly
distressing circumstances in which the subject lives, instead of defining distress per se as a
cardinal symptom of a brand-new disorder, the concept of a disorder that was built into DSM-III
might have taken a different shape, because (as noted) it was in response to the homosexuality
crisis that Spitzer first advanced the notion of a mental disorder as turning upon distress or
impairment. Had the crisis itself evolved differently, perhaps the DSM concept of disorder—
liberal enough to allow for the diagnosis of homosexuality after it had been rescinded, provided
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only that patients were in conflict with themselves—would have been anchored to some form
of Washingtonian validation. (Spitzer himself once observed that the diagnosis of PTSD may
well reduce to depression plus phobia [Rosen, Spitzer & McHugh, 2008]—Feighner categories,
as it happens.) After all, to substantiate his claim that the DSM-II diagnosis of homosexuality
lacked a scientific foundation, Spitzer need only have pointed out that it fails every Feighner
test, beginning with the basic requirement of distinctive clinical features. However, at a
historical juncture when DSM-II was crumbling and new diagnostic standards—in the first
instance, the Feighner criteria—were coming into play, the improvised notion of Sexual
Orientation Disturbance did its job of patching up a conflict in the APA well enough that its
weakness as a diagnosis attracted little attention.

The Feighner authors were not indifferent to considerations of distress and impairment,
both of which figure in their paper as measures of symptom severity, not determinants of
disorder. In the DSM system introduced in 1980, distress and impairment serve as the latter,
occupying something like the governing position held by tests of validation in the Feighner
document. It is these gatekeepers—distress and impairment—that have presided over an
immense expansion of the index of mental disorders beyond the handful codified by the
Feighner group in 1972. While DSM-III was being drafted, letters flowed in to the Task Force
arguing that a given condition should be included in the new manual because psychiatrists see
patients with it—not necessarily because it satisfies the abstract definition of a disorder
(Cooper, 2005). Effectively granting these entreaties, the distress and impairment criteria serve
to credential the sort of conditions seen by psychiatrists (or enough psychiatrists), in that
patients visit psychiatrists because they feel distressed or impaired in the first place. So it is
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that the number of DSM diagnoses has swelled as if it were scarcely subject to constraint in
theory or practice. In the end, it seems, the legacy of the Feighner criteria is not diagnostic
skepticism and correspondingly rigorous standards of validation but a checklist format that
gives an impressive appearance of rigor and precision. Recall that in Spitzer’s estimation, if the
Feighner criteria hadn’t emerged the most consequential difference is that “operationalized
criteria”—in plain words, checklists—would have been delayed for years.
Perhaps we can consider the diagnostic device of Sexual Orientation Disturbance, for
those distressed by their own sexuality, as the starting point of the proliferation that ultimately
made the very table of contents of DSM-5 some 27 pages long. After the deletion of
homosexuality from DSM-II, psychiatrists could conceivably have continued to treat gay
patients for depression, a well-established condition for which they were at elevated risk,
according to the textbook co-authored by two of the Feighner group. How much difference is
there, really, between being distressed by one’s sexuality and being depressed by it, that is,
overcome with discouragement (even despondency) and guilt (even self-loathing)? Feighner et
al. recognize a possible overlap between homosexuality and depression, specifying as they do
that in order to qualify for the latter one cannot be suffering from any of a number of
“preexisting psychiatric conditions,” including homosexuality. Even so, under the Feighner
categories there is the diagnosis of “secondary depression” for one whose distress comes from
homosexuality—say, a gay male who deeply regrets being unable to have children (Ruse, 1981).
That anyone really stood to be psychiatrically orphaned by the APA’s declassification of
homosexuality seems unlikely. And yet the APA trustees opted for a new, not to say
newfangled, diagnosis, as if the removal of one disorder demanded the creation of another.
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Did they consider that they might be setting a precedent for the creation of makeshift
diagnoses?
Crafted by Spitzer specifically to give the warring factions of the APA something to agree
on, the diagnosis of Sexual Orientation Disturbance may have been reliable but could hardly be
deemed valid. Certainly neither Spitzer nor anyone else could pretend that it was validated by
the likes of follow-up investigations, if only because such things take time, and the disorder in
question was no sooner coined than codified. A diagnosis in search of patients, Sexual
Orientation Disturbance, under the new name of Ego-dystonic Homosexuality, was little used in
clinical practice (Conrad, 2007) and was deleted from DSM-III-R and largely forgotten, having
served its purpose as an interim category for those APA members who weren’t ready to let go
of homosexuality and needed to taper off. It too was a useful category. With its brief moment
of existence, SOD is only a little less tenuous than disorders that never quite achieved
existence, such as “Self-Defeating Personality Disorder,” a construct that was floated in an
appendix to DSM-III-R but didn’t win enough support to enter the DSM canon of entities.
In that those afflicted with it bring suffering on themselves and spoil their chances of
success, “Self-Defeating Personality Disorder” appealed implicitly to the distress and
impairment criteria that entered the DSM cultural system through Spitzer’s efforts. With his
argument that a single set of criteria, three words long, disqualified the diagnosis of
homosexuality and underwrote the replacement diagnosis of Sexual Orientation Disturbance,
Spitzer wielded a sort of Occam’s razor that cut neatly through the argumentative noise of the
homosexuality debates. Quite unlike other Occam’s razors, though, the distress and
impairment criteria allowed for the multiplication of entities, and that in the not very long run.
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Under the welcoming aegis of distress and impairment, innumerable disorders have sought and
very many have found DSM status since 1980. Though homosexuality has long since
disappeared from the DSM system, then, it did not disappear without a trace. As a result we
are compelled to this day to think carefully about the foundation of proposed and even existing
diagnostic categories, as in the de-classification drama of the 1970s.
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